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????這是一個(gè)美國(guó)人家喻戶曉的故事,，而現(xiàn)在它也許正在中國(guó)徐徐拉開序幕。

????2008年至2010年期間,，中國(guó)大型銀行向本國(guó)政府以及國(guó)有企業(yè)發(fā)放了大量的貸款,。由于出口在金融危機(jī)中遭受重創(chuàng)，政府不得不采取措施增加就業(yè)并擴(kuò)大內(nèi)需,。結(jié)果,，高樓大廈和大型商場(chǎng)在中國(guó)遍地開花,，中國(guó)的經(jīng)濟(jì)也因此保持了約10%的增長(zhǎng)速度。但是部分分析人士和評(píng)級(jí)機(jī)構(gòu)認(rèn)為中國(guó)的借貸審核標(biāo)準(zhǔn)不夠嚴(yán)格,。他們說(shuō),，銀行的壞賬層出不窮，但金融系統(tǒng)的改革卻裹足不前,。

????上周,，中國(guó)銀監(jiān)會(huì)（China Banking Regulatory Commission）主席劉明康宣布，最近的銀行抗壓測(cè)試表明即使房?jī)r(jià)下跌五成,，中國(guó)銀行業(yè)也能夠承受,。中國(guó)的銀行主要是靠存款來(lái)獲取資金，而且利潤(rùn)年增長(zhǎng)率達(dá)到了20%,。盡管現(xiàn)在經(jīng)濟(jì)增速放緩,，相關(guān)方面仍預(yù)測(cè)今年中國(guó)的GDP增速仍將維持在9%左右，在理論上,，這一增長(zhǎng)率足以抵消壞賬所帶來(lái)的損失,。

????至少?gòu)你y行業(yè)發(fā)展的長(zhǎng)期角度來(lái)看，劉主席并沒有說(shuō)錯(cuò),。雖然一些分析師人士稱抗壓測(cè)試的壓力過(guò)小,，但是所有的存款仍有央行來(lái)做擔(dān)保。中國(guó)的銀行業(yè)仍處在起步階段,，發(fā)展?jié)摿Σ豢上蘖?。目前使用信用卡的消費(fèi)者仍然不多，這對(duì)于金融機(jī)構(gòu)來(lái)說(shuō)是一個(gè)巨大的商機(jī),。隨著中國(guó)貨幣政策的緊縮,，銀行的借貸收益也會(huì)水漲船高。

????在短期內(nèi),，熊市仍將占據(jù)主導(dǎo)地位,。目前有三個(gè)方面的問題比較突出。首要的問題是中國(guó)利率政策過(guò)于死板：銀行一年期存款的年儲(chǔ)蓄利率不能超過(guò)3.5%,。然而由于中國(guó)目前的通脹率高于5%,，中國(guó)企業(yè)和消費(fèi)者在銀行的存款實(shí)際利率為負(fù)。

三大問題

????結(jié)果,，希望獲得高儲(chǔ)蓄利率的公司將目光投向了信托公司,。然而中國(guó)的信托市場(chǎng)缺乏規(guī)范，而且由于政府一直正忙于給過(guò)熱的房地產(chǎn)市場(chǎng)降溫,，相關(guān)部門對(duì)這一領(lǐng)域十分警惕,。《中國(guó)證券報(bào)》（China Securities Journal）的報(bào)道顯示,，前半年信托公司在地產(chǎn)領(lǐng)域的投資約為2,078億人民幣（324億美元）,。信托公司的借貸利率已超過(guò)20%,，而銀行僅為6.7%，不過(guò)這一利率也有利于銀行壞賬的展期（是指貸款人在向貸款銀行申請(qǐng)并獲得批準(zhǔn)的情況下,，延期償還貸款的行為——譯注）,。

????目前中國(guó)信托業(yè)務(wù)的贊成派和反對(duì)派爭(zhēng)論的焦點(diǎn)在于信托業(yè)務(wù)到底會(huì)對(duì)中國(guó)銀行業(yè)造成多大的沖擊。贊成派認(rèn)為信托業(yè)務(wù)代表了健康的利率競(jìng)爭(zhēng),，隨之而來(lái)的壓力將迫使決策者們放寬利率管制政策,。反對(duì)派則認(rèn)為信托公司是多年魯莽放貸之后信用過(guò)度擴(kuò)張的產(chǎn)物，兩者最終都會(huì)在幾年后危及中國(guó)經(jīng)濟(jì),。

????另外一個(gè)問題來(lái)自于中國(guó)資產(chǎn)管理公司（China's Asset Management Corporations,，AMCs），它的表外貸款風(fēng)險(xiǎn)更大,。上世紀(jì)90年代末,，中國(guó)政府需要處理亞洲金融危機(jī)所產(chǎn)生的壞賬。中國(guó)資產(chǎn)管理公司應(yīng)運(yùn)而生,。但是在2009年,，中國(guó)政府并未償還剩余的債務(wù)，而是將資產(chǎn)管理公司的所有債券展期10年,。因此很難預(yù)計(jì)這一融資平臺(tái)最終會(huì)帶來(lái)多大的損失,。

????最后的問題來(lái)自于抵押貸款的繼續(xù)使用。抵押物一般都是土地或房產(chǎn),。咨詢公司畢馬威（KPMG）的杰森貝德福德說(shuō)，一旦遭遇經(jīng)濟(jì)不景氣,，中國(guó)的銀行可能會(huì)面臨流動(dòng)性問題,。

????與此同時(shí)，貝德福德認(rèn)為人們對(duì)資產(chǎn)負(fù)債表中所隱藏的壞賬的擔(dān)憂過(guò)于夸大,。他說(shuō),，“我每周都會(huì)接到一到兩個(gè)電話來(lái)詢問此事?！彼€特別提到了穆迪評(píng)級(jí)公司（Moody’s, MCO）7月所發(fā)表的一份報(bào)告,，其中提到了中國(guó)政府實(shí)際向地方政府所發(fā)放的貸款可能要比公布的總額高出5,000億美元。貝德福德說(shuō)他自己的調(diào)查并不支持穆迪公司的報(bào)告,，特別涉及是信用風(fēng)險(xiǎn)的內(nèi)容,。

????評(píng)估中國(guó)銀行業(yè)的障礙在于：誰(shuí)的數(shù)據(jù)更可信。中國(guó)銀行系統(tǒng)絕大部分的交易都是內(nèi)部交易,，有關(guān)銀行健康狀況的關(guān)鍵數(shù)據(jù)都帶有主觀色彩,。中國(guó)資本市場(chǎng)很難見到外國(guó)公司的身影，關(guān)鍵信息的可信度也難以得到佐證,。沒有人知道資產(chǎn)價(jià)格是否準(zhǔn)確,，銀行債務(wù)的報(bào)告是否屬實(shí),，甚至是借貸市場(chǎng)的真實(shí)情況也無(wú)從證實(shí)。

????唯一的辦法就是全盤吸收銀行財(cái)務(wù)報(bào)表和國(guó)家統(tǒng)計(jì)局的信息,，同時(shí)還得考慮執(zhí)政黨的動(dòng)機(jī)因素,。雖然中國(guó)政府十分害怕出現(xiàn)系統(tǒng)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)，但它仍然需要監(jiān)控好銀行來(lái)實(shí)現(xiàn)和諧社會(huì)這個(gè)終極目標(biāo),。這個(gè)本身就存在一定的風(fēng)險(xiǎn),。

????魯比尼全球經(jīng)濟(jì)咨詢公司(Roubini Global Economics)最近的報(bào)告顯示，中國(guó)銀行業(yè)近來(lái)不斷惡化的信用標(biāo)準(zhǔn)是人們目前最為關(guān)心的問題,，但由此引發(fā)的另外一個(gè)擔(dān)憂是政府拒絕放棄將商業(yè)銀行業(yè)作為其私人儲(chǔ)錢罐,。

????盡管中國(guó)銀行業(yè)在過(guò)去的幾十年中取得了快速、驚人的增長(zhǎng),，然而其內(nèi)部存在的問題也開始浮出水面,。雖然中國(guó)可能已經(jīng)吸取了美國(guó)的教訓(xùn)，但它難免會(huì)犯一些中國(guó)式錯(cuò)誤,。

????It's a familiar story to Americans, but now it may be unfolding in China.

????From 2008-2010, China's largest banks made scores of loans to local governments and state-run companies. Exports had fallen in the wake of the financial crisis, so the government wanted to create jobs and boost local demand. As a result, developers erected high rises and shopping malls across the country and the Chinese economy grew at roughly a 10% clip. But some analysts and ratings agencies assert that lending standards weren't strict enough. Too many bad loans were made, they say. Financial reform didn't come fast enough.

????Last week, Liu Mingkang, the chairman of the China Banking Regulatory Commission, announced that a recent round of stress tests proved that Chinese banks could handle up to a 50% drop in property prices. Banks, which fund themselves mainly through deposits, are growing their profits at 20% per year. Though the economy appears to be slowing, it is still estimated to grow around 9% this year, which could theoretically offset any losses incurred by bad loans.

????Liu may well be right, at least in looking at the sector over the long term. Though some analysts balk at the lack of stress in the stress tests, the Chinese central bank essentially backs all deposits. Banking in China is still in its infancy, with huge upside potential. Few consumers use credit cards yet, which represents a major opportunity for financial institutions. And as China tightens its monetary policy, lending margins are tilting even more in favor of the banks.

????In the near-term, however, the bears may win out. Three areas of concern stand out. The first is China's overly managed interest rate policy: Banks are only allowed to offer its customers a maximum 3.5% interest rate on one-year deposits. With China's inflation rate currently above 5%, Chinese companies and consumers investing in banks face the prospect of a negative real savings rate.

Three areas of concern

????As a result, companies that want better rates of return are looking at trust companies, which are unregulated and have caught the wary eye of Chinese authorities, particularly as the government has attempted to cool the countrys supposedly overheating property market. The China Securities Journal reported that trusts invested about RMB 207.8 billion ($32.4 billion) in the property market in the first half of the year. The rate at which they're lending is upward of 20%, compared to the banks' 6.7%, a rate at which it is easier to roll over bad loans.

????The extent to which these trusts will have a major effect on the health of the Chinese banking industry is a major area of disagreement between China's bulls and bears. The bulls say that trusts represent healthy interest rate competition, a way for corporations to put pressure on regulators to liberalize interest rate policy. The bears argue that trusts are an example of excessive credit in the aftermath of years of reckless lending, both of which will come back to haunt the Chinese economy over the next few years.

????Another source of worry is China's Asset Management Corporations (AMCs), which present more measurable off-balance-sheet loan risk. In the late 1990s, the Chinese government needed a place to dump bad loans left over from the Asian financial crisis. AMCs were created to serve this purpose. But in 2009, instead of paying off the rest of the debt, the government rolled over all the AMC bonds another ten years. The depth of the potential losses in these vehicles remains unclear.

????A final source of concern is the continued use of collateralized lending. Much of this collateral is typically in the form of land or property. In an economic downturn, Chinese banks might face liquidity issues, says Jason Bedford of KPMG, a consultancy.

????All the same, Bedford thinks the fears about the bad loans lurking off the balance sheet are overblown. "I'm getting one or two phone calls per week from overseas asking me about this topic," he says, specifically referring to a July report in which Moody's (MCO) said the Chinese government may have underreported loans made to local governments by half a trillion dollars. Bedford says his own analysis doesn't support some of the claims in Moody's report, particularly those relating to credit risk.

????And herein lies the problem in assessing Chinas banks: figuring out whose data to trust. The Chinese banking system trades disproportionately with itself, and much of the critical information about bank stability is colored by the data sources.There are so few foreign companies trading within China's capital markets that critical pieces of data can never be corroborated. No one knows whether asset prices are accurate, whether banks liabilities are accurately reported, or even the true depth of the lending market.

????The only way to judge, then, is by examining it all -- banks' financial statements and information from national statistics bureaus, keeping in mind the motivations of the ruling party. Though the Chinese government is terrified of systemic risk, it also needs to control its banks in order to promote its ultimate vision of a harmonious society. This cause presents risks of its own.

????A recent report from Roubini Global Economics says the most critical concern for Chinese banks is the recent deterioration of credit standards, but that a major side concern is the state's refusal to stop using the commercial banking sector as its personal piggy bank.

????Though China's banking system has undergone decades of rapid and impressive growth, underlying cracks are starting to appear. China may have learned from America's mistakes, but it will inevitably make some of its own.