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????在過去兩年里,，我擔(dān)任了Myspace的聯(lián)合總裁和CEO,。我經(jīng)常被問道：“你為什么要接受這份工作？”這是個合情合理的問題,。我之前是一個創(chuàng)業(yè)企業(yè)家,，因此，Myspace的這份工作似乎與我的個性并不吻合,。但對我來說,，這份工作其實(shí)非常適合我，原因如下：

?????Myspace當(dāng)時面臨著很多挑戰(zhàn),，我想知道我們究竟是否能夠讓這樣一個擁有悠久歷史的互聯(lián)網(wǎng)品牌實(shí)現(xiàn)復(fù)興,。

?????我想深入了解這樣一個巨大的媒體資產(chǎn)運(yùn)作的機(jī)制。

?????我想在我的老家洛杉磯工作,。

????一年前,，我們對這個歷史悠久的互聯(lián)網(wǎng)品牌執(zhí)行了一項(xiàng)最重大的改版。我們將Myspace重新定位成一家社交娛樂型網(wǎng)站,，并且引入了全新的技術(shù)平臺,、產(chǎn)品和內(nèi)容,。但是改版后的Myspace在消費(fèi)者中引起的反響不如我們預(yù)期的那么熱烈。

????今年八月,，在Myspace被廣告技術(shù)公司Specific Media收購后,，我卸任CEO一職。此后,，我得以有時間思考我在Myspace的經(jīng)驗(yàn)和教訓(xùn),。雖然還有很多關(guān)于Myspace的故事可能無法在本文中一一道出，不過我還是愿意與諸位轉(zhuǎn)型期的CEO,、互聯(lián)網(wǎng)企業(yè)的管理者,，以及滿懷激情的夢想家們分享一些重要的教訓(xùn)。

????Myspace究竟發(fā)生了什么,？

????Myspace當(dāng)時的確面臨許多組織上的問題,，影響了公司的轉(zhuǎn)型速度。但是說到底,，還是公司的基本面拖了我們的后腿,。許多其他歷史悠久的網(wǎng)絡(luò)公司也面臨著同樣的問題。以下是我們學(xué)到的一些最重大的教訓(xùn),。

????1. 消費(fèi)者有很長的品牌記憶,。

????2. 實(shí)用性比娛樂性的生命力更長久。

????3. 感知到的勢頭=感知到的價值

????4. 大型企業(yè)的內(nèi)部變革必須以大刀闊斧的行動為中心展開,。

????5. 單一門戶=單一故障點(diǎn)

????長期品牌記憶,。這個教訓(xùn)是專門針對那些擁有悠久歷史的老品牌的：要記住，通常說來,，創(chuàng)立一個新的品牌所獲得的回饋,，要大于投資于一個現(xiàn)有的品牌。例如谷歌（Google）推出了Google Plus這個新的社交平臺,，而不是投資改進(jìn)現(xiàn)有的Buzz或Orkut,。美國在線（AOL）花大力氣推廣新產(chǎn)品Patch，而不是現(xiàn)有的AOL Local,。而我們卻選擇了保留Myspace的品牌,，這是一個錯誤。我們發(fā)現(xiàn),，無論我們再怎么改進(jìn)產(chǎn)品和營銷信息,，消費(fèi)者對這個品牌的記憶還是太強(qiáng)大了，使他們無法用全新的眼光和開放的心態(tài)來對待Myspace,。我們始終無法超越Myspace的動態(tài)GIF在他們心中的經(jīng)典地位,。

????可能有人會說，如果投入更多的時間和營銷資金,，我們可能最終能夠改變消費(fèi)者對Myspace的觀念,。但事實(shí)上,，大型的品牌活動對于其他大型互聯(lián)網(wǎng)公司也同樣沒有效果。比如雅虎（Yahoo）在“It's Y!ou”廣告活動上砸了1億美元,，但最終收效甚微,。我不認(rèn)為一個大型的消費(fèi)活動就能顯著改變Myspace的命運(yùn)。說到底,，我相信如果我們當(dāng)初把Myspace改版成為一個全新的品牌,，也許它成功的機(jī)會更大。

????實(shí)用性比娛樂性活的生命力更長久,。Myspace Music這個品牌有很強(qiáng)的娛樂性,。它有個叫做Secret Shows的流行功能，為Myspace的用戶獨(dú)家呈現(xiàn)了一系列頂級歌手的免費(fèi)演唱會,，在用戶的線上和線下體驗(yàn)之間成功地搭起了一座橋梁,，并且在消費(fèi)者中建立了一定的品牌口碑。在網(wǎng)站改版時,，我們希望能夠捕捉Myspace Music的精髓，并且將它延伸到網(wǎng)站的其它娛樂門類,。

????然而,，Myspace最缺乏的是實(shí)用性——也就是說，我們并沒有一種促使用戶每天都要登錄網(wǎng)站的產(chǎn)品,，一種對于消費(fèi)者來說具有長期實(shí)用性的產(chǎn)品,。比如Facebook從一開始就要求用戶實(shí)名注冊。這一做法幫助Facebook建立起了一個真實(shí)世界的社交圖譜,，它對于用戶來說有著絕對的實(shí)用性,。換句話說，它有著長期的價值,。雖說Myspace也有它的娛樂價值,，但考慮到它的匿名性和娛樂性，Myspace主打的是興趣圖譜,，它在實(shí)用性上從來沒有達(dá)到Facebook的水平,。

????雅虎和谷歌也是很好的例子。雅虎是一個內(nèi)容型的娛樂品牌,，但也提供郵件和照片等實(shí)用性功能,。相比之下，谷歌幾乎完全主打?qū)嵱眯?。我們的教?xùn)是,，市場和消費(fèi)者先天就是更傾向于實(shí)用性，而不是娛樂性,，因?yàn)閷?shí)用性可以使他們的日常生活變得更加輕松,，而消費(fèi)者更容易與這些實(shí)用功能培養(yǎng)出更長期和持久的關(guān)系,。

????感知到的勢頭=感知到的價值。到2010年8月,，Myspace每月都與1億多名用戶進(jìn)行互動,，網(wǎng)頁訪問量數(shù)以十億記，歌曲下載量達(dá)數(shù)億首,。盡管這些數(shù)據(jù)十分驚人,，但Myspace的市場價值卻遠(yuǎn)遠(yuǎn)低于許多規(guī)模更小，但提供相似服務(wù)的公司,。

????我們的教訓(xùn)是：市場是根據(jù)對一家公司勢頭的感知,，來確定這家公司的價值的，不管這是一家小公司,，還是一家大型的老牌公司,。而對于創(chuàng)業(yè)公司來說，我敢說勢頭就是一切,。在給初創(chuàng)公司提供咨詢時,，我往往建議他們，要么著重展現(xiàn)吸引用戶的能力,，要么著重展現(xiàn)吸引收入的能力——但一般來說,，同時做到這兩點(diǎn)是很困難的。最糟糕的情況就是,，一家初創(chuàng)公司在這兩方面的勢頭都比較一般,，無法展現(xiàn)出清晰、強(qiáng)勁的增長勢頭,。

????Over the last two years, I served as co-?president and then CEO of Myspace. I am often asked, "Why did you take that job?" It is a fair question. As a former startup entrepreneur, the Myspace role seemed out of character. But for me, Myspace was actually a perfect fit for the following reasons:

????? I wanted to know if it could be done -- if we could revive a legacy Internet brand that had so many challenges.

????? I wanted to study how a large media property works from the inside out.

????? I wanted to do it in my hometown of Los Angeles.

????A year ago, we executed one of the most significant relaunches of a historical Internet brand. We repositioned Myspace (NWS) as a social entertainment destination and introduced an entirely new technology platform, new products and refreshed content. However, the new Myspace didn't gain as much traction with consumers as we had hoped.

????In August, after Specific Media acquired Myspace, I stepped down as CEO. Since then, I've been able to reflect upon my experience there. Although there will be many stories about Myspace left untold, I learned some important lessons that I'd like to share with fellow turnaround CEOs, anyone charged with running an Internet business -- and the passionate dreamers.

????So, what happened?

????While it's true that Myspace faced a variety of organizational challenges that impacted the speed at which we could transform the company, in the end, it was the fundamentals that held us back. And, many other legacy Internet businesses are grappling with the same kinds of problems. Here are some of the top lessons we learned:

????1. Consumers have long brand memories.

????2. Utility outlasts entertainment.

????3. Perceived momentum = perceived value.

????4. Change within large organizations must be centered around drastic actions.

????5. Single front door = single point of failure.

????Long Brand Memories. The lesson here is for legacy brands: there is often more reward for creating a new brand than investing in an existing brand. For example, Google (GOOG) launched Plus, not Buzz or Orkut. AOL (AOL) focused on Patch, not AOL Local. Yet in our case, we chose to keep the Myspace brand. This was a mistake. We found that regardless of how much we improved the product or the marketing message –– consumers' memories about the brand were too strong to allow them to view Myspace with fresh eyes and an open mind. We could not escape their images of animated GIFs.

????It could be argued that with more time and more marketing dollars, we might have been able to change users' perceptions of Myspace. However, massive brand campaigns haven't worked to turn around other big Internet companies. Yahoo's (YHOO) $100 million "It's Y!ou" ad campaign is one such example. I don't think a large consumer campaign would have significantly changed the outcome for Myspace. In the end, I believe Myspace would have had a better chance for success if we had relaunched it as an entirely new brand.

????Utility Outlasts Entertainment. Myspace Music has always had a strong brand affiliation with entertainment. Its popular Secret Shows franchise -- a series of free concerts with top artists exclusively for Myspace users -- helped to create an incredible bridge between online and offline experiences and established a certain brand tone in consumers' minds. With the relaunch, we sought to capture the essence of Myspace Music and expand it to other entertainment categories on the site.

????However, where Myspace came up short was on utility -- that is, we didn't have a product that compelled users to come to the site every day, something that had true-long lasting utility for consumers. At its inception, Facebook required users' to register with their real names. This helped it develop a real world social graph that was a true utility for users and thus. In other words, it has long-lasting value. Whereas Myspace's entertainment value, with its optional anonymity and its entertainment -?‐ focused interest graph, never achieved the same level of utility for consumers.

????Yahoo and Google are also a good example of this. Yahoo is a content oriented, entertainment brand with some utility via email, photos, etc. Compare that to Google, which is near‐pure utility to the consumer. The lesson here is that the market and consumers are predisposed to value utility over entertainment because consumers create longer lasting relationships with utilities that make their daily lives easier.

????Perceived momentum = perceived value. As of August 2010, Myspace was interacting with over 100 million users a month, generating billions of page views and streaming hundreds of millions of songs. Yet, despite these incredible metrics, the market value for Myspace was far below the value placed on many other smaller, yet similar, businesses.

????The lesson here is that the market determines value based on the perception of a company's momentum, whether it's a small businesses or a large legacy enterprise. For startups, I would go a step further and say that momentum is everything. When I advise start‐ups, I recommend they focus on showing either user traction or revenue traction -- but typically it is hard to do both. In fact, one of the worst places a startup can end up is having modest momentum in both areas but not being able to show clear, strong growth momentum.