????豐田公司在危難時機(jī)的指導(dǎo)原則之一是genchi genbutsu,，即“親自到現(xiàn)場查看”。我追蹤豐田公司已有20余年,。因此,，為了親自了解這些變革對于豐田的意義所在，我赴加利福尼亞和紐約采訪了數(shù)位豐田公司高管,，隨后又飛赴日本,。
????豐田經(jīng)歷的所有困境中，沒有什么比2009-2010年的召回危機(jī)更嚴(yán)重的了,。當(dāng)時有報(bào)告稱,，由于汽車失去控制、剎車失靈而引發(fā)駭人聽聞的事故,，其中有些事故甚至造成了人員傷亡的慘劇,。最終公司召回了800多萬輛豐田車和雷克薩斯，相當(dāng)于公司一年的產(chǎn)量,。獨(dú)立調(diào)查結(jié)果最終顯示,，豐田汽車并不存在機(jī)械或者電力方面的缺陷，只有一些地墊放置錯誤,、加速器踏板粘滯以及駕駛員操作失當(dāng)方面的原因,，但調(diào)查結(jié)果也暴露了公司文化上的重大缺陷。豐田公司的管理依然沿襲了上世紀(jì)五十年代的模式,。日本總部嚴(yán)格掌控著公司的每一個決策,；美國市場就如同附屬國一般毫無自主權(quán)。如果美國的經(jīng)理人發(fā)現(xiàn)汽車存在缺陷,，他們不得不沿著一條復(fù)雜的官僚主義路徑來向日本總部反映問題,，但在總部，他們常常遭遇到的是懷疑和提防,。豐田一直擔(dān)心患上“大企業(yè)病”,，但最終它還是沒能逃脫這樣的命運(yùn)。
????消費(fèi)者對豐田汽車的信心大降,，公司上層也深受震動,。負(fù)責(zé)豐田汽車北美市場銷售和管理的稻葉良睍告訴我：“我們意識到，公司并非如我們所想的那樣，遠(yuǎn)遠(yuǎn)超越我們的競爭者,。過去我們有些太自以為是,。”豐田開始建立更迅速的反應(yīng)機(jī)制,。當(dāng)時,，雷克薩斯多功能車中發(fā)現(xiàn)了一處缺陷，豐田在短短八天之內(nèi)就組織召回,。但豐田對于向美國市場授予更多管理權(quán)限仍比較猶豫,。豐田沒有指派一人全權(quán)負(fù)責(zé)北美市場的運(yùn)作，而是依然保持了傳統(tǒng)的匯報(bào)制度,。公司在加利福尼亞南部的大規(guī)模銷售業(yè)務(wù)以及在肯塔基州的大型制造總部仍然要向日本總部的相應(yīng)高管匯報(bào),。
????正當(dāng)新的管理層試圖走出召回危機(jī)的陰影之時，豐田在3月份又經(jīng)受了一次艱難考驗(yàn),。當(dāng)時,，日本發(fā)生的強(qiáng)烈地震和大規(guī)模海嘯使得公司生產(chǎn)陷入混亂。這場災(zāi)難破壞了日本北部的工廠,，500多個零部件的供應(yīng)受到嚴(yán)重影響,，而豐田公司又無法找到替代產(chǎn)品,。位于豐田市（Toyota City）附近的一級準(zhǔn)時制供應(yīng)商并未受到直接影響,，但位于北部的二級和三級供應(yīng)商情況如何，公司并不清楚,。
????豐田章男召集了位于日本的車身工程和動力系統(tǒng)等部門總經(jīng)理,，指示他們立即恢復(fù)生產(chǎn)，無需浪費(fèi)時間向上匯報(bào),。這一舉動非同尋常,。供應(yīng)商恢復(fù)生產(chǎn)之前，公司派出了一支由兩名工程師組成的團(tuán)隊(duì)奔赴各個供應(yīng)商工廠,，以確定所需備用部件的類型和產(chǎn)地,。根據(jù)萊克的統(tǒng)計(jì)，到4月份,，供應(yīng)缺失的零部件數(shù)量下降到了150個,；5月份，全部500個零部件中只剩下30個供應(yīng)不足,。 豐田只用了計(jì)劃時間的一半,，就解決了問題。但是萊克指出,，公司損失的產(chǎn)量任然高達(dá)800,000,，相當(dāng)于年產(chǎn)量的10%。公司本來計(jì)劃通過加班加點(diǎn)來彌補(bǔ)大部分差額，但泰國10月份的洪災(zāi)影響了約100家供應(yīng)商的生產(chǎn),，推遲了這一目標(biāo)的實(shí)現(xiàn),。因此，公司在北美的存貨要到3月份之后才能補(bǔ)足,。 |
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????One of Toyota's guiding principles in times of crisis is genchi genbutsu, or "go and see." So to find out for myself what the changes meant for a company I had been covering for more than 20 years, I interviewed Toyota executives in California and New York, and then flew to Japan.
????Of all the woes Toyota has suffered, none has stung like the recall crisis of 2009-10. Ignited by reports of horrific accidents, some fatal, caused by cars that ran out of control and couldn't be braked to a stop, it eventually involved the recall more than 8 million Toyotas and Lexuses -- equivalent to a year's production. Independent investigations turned up no mechanical or electronic defects -- only some misplaced floor mats and sticky accelerator pedals to go along with driver error -- but exposed major flaws in the corporate culture. Toyota, it turned out, was still being managed the way it had been in the 1950s: Every decision was tightly controlled in Japan; the U.S. was treated like a vassal state. When American managers found defects in vehicles, they had to follow a tortuous bureaucratic process to register their complaints in Japan, where they were often met with skepticism and defensiveness. As it had long feared, Toyota had succumbed to "big-company disease."
????Consumer confidence in its cars plummeted, and Toyota's higher-ups were shaken. "We learned we are not so ahead of competitors as we might have thought," Yoshimi Inaba, who heads sales and administration in the U.S., told me. "We were a little complacent." Toyota began to develop quicker reflexes. When a defect was identified in a Lexus SUV, Toyota organized a recall in just eight days. But it balked at delegating more executive authority to America. Rather than designate one person to head all of its North American operations, it maintained its traditional silo structure. Its giant sales operation in Southern California, and its equally large manufacturing complex headquartered in Kentucky, continued reporting to different executives in Japan.
????Just as it was trying to put the recall crisis behind it, the new management was tested again in March, when an earthquake and massive tidal wave disrupted production. The tsunami damaged plants in the north of Japan, disrupting the supply of over 500 parts, and Toyota couldn't find replacements. Its first-tier, just-in-time suppliers near Toyota City were not directly affected, but up north were second- and third-tier suppliers that Toyota did not know much about.
????Akio assembled general managers of departments such as body engineering and powertrain in Japan, and took the unusual step of instructing them to restore production and not waste time reporting upward. They sent two-man teams of engineers to visit each supplier plant and to identify and locate backup parts until the suppliers were running again. By April, unavailable parts were down to 150, and by May, according to Liker's count, all but 30 of the 500 parts were available. Toyota solved the problems in half the time expected, but Liker figures the company still lost 800,000 production units -- 10% of its annual output. Plans to make up most of the shortfall through overtime work were pushed back by October floods in Thailand that affected about 100 suppliers. As a result, inventories in North America won't be completely replenished until March. |
