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????創(chuàng)業(yè)公司基因組（Startup Genome）項(xiàng)目最近發(fā)布了一份關(guān)于互聯(lián)網(wǎng)創(chuàng)業(yè)公司DNA的報(bào)告,，簡(jiǎn)而言之,，就是試圖找出決定這些公司成敗的特質(zhì)。他們的研究成果之一是：74%創(chuàng)業(yè)公司的失敗都源于“過早進(jìn)行擴(kuò)張”,。它聽起來像是一種不幸的病癥,，但就互聯(lián)網(wǎng)公司來說，它指的是公司還沒有弄清楚自己有多少底牌——產(chǎn)品,、顧客和市場(chǎng)之類,，就耗費(fèi)了過多的資金。

????閱讀這份報(bào)告,，以及我在科技題材方面的合作伙伴弗雷德?德斯汀就此撰寫的博文,，我不禁想起了生命科學(xué)創(chuàng)業(yè)公司擴(kuò)張過早的問題?；ㄥX過度及增長(zhǎng)太快在生物科技領(lǐng)域司空見慣,，而且?guī)缀蹩偸窃斐赏顿Y虧損和股東的不幸。

????在我看來,，生物科技領(lǐng)域存在四種過早擴(kuò)張（或曰不當(dāng)擴(kuò)張）的現(xiàn)象,，現(xiàn)一一列舉如下，一般來說,，我們都會(huì)盡量完全避免這些錯(cuò)誤：

????1. 過快建造“大科學(xué)”公司,。一些諾貝爾獎(jiǎng)獲得者就青睞這樣“要么大，要么死”的策略：沒有掌握足夠的證據(jù),，尚未完成某種疾病的靶標(biāo)驗(yàn)證,，沒有證實(shí)化學(xué)上（或生物上的）可控性，或者先期項(xiàng)目尚缺乏進(jìn)展,，就開始籌集數(shù)額驚人的資金,，用于某種新發(fā)現(xiàn)或研究平臺(tái)的發(fā)展,。這種做法能夠催生龐大的團(tuán)隊(duì)，加上涉足領(lǐng)域廣泛,，因此往往能夠轟動(dòng)一時(shí),，但是它燒錢的速度同樣驚人。如果對(duì)目標(biāo)物質(zhì)的研究,，特別是產(chǎn)品開發(fā)方面的迅速進(jìn)展無法取得成果,，公司的估值就會(huì)一落千丈，相關(guān)投資血本無歸,。

????如今,，打造大科學(xué)公司的正確方法是在科技先行,、節(jié)約資本方針的指導(dǎo)下,，逐步擴(kuò)大規(guī)模：適度籌集資本，招聘15-20個(gè)全職員工,，打造一個(gè)基礎(chǔ)穩(wěn)固的開發(fā)平臺(tái),，同時(shí)尋找合作伙伴，以降低平臺(tái)發(fā)展和靶標(biāo)確證的費(fèi)用,，然后在研發(fā)工作取得進(jìn)展的前提下成長(zhǎng)為大科技公司,。錯(cuò)誤的方式則是盲目樂觀地大舉籌資，并隨著資金涌入而迅速擴(kuò)張,，多數(shù)情況下這種做法都會(huì)使投資者吃大虧,。

????Synta公司就是擴(kuò)張過快的典型例子。他們累計(jì)籌集和花費(fèi)了3.5億美元資金,，最多的時(shí)候全職員工數(shù)超過150人,，旗下的產(chǎn)品組合也很豐富，但投資者卻損失慘重,。這家公司的發(fā)展還遠(yuǎn)未到頭,，可它成立已經(jīng)有10年之久，目前依然沒有取得突破性的進(jìn)展,，對(duì)早期投資者來說前景不妙,。

????有時(shí)候這種模式也能成事——至少吃虧的不是投資者。如果該公司能憑借市場(chǎng)上的興奮情緒和泡沫達(dá)到“逃逸速度”,，它們就可能上市或早早地被其他公司收購,。Sirtris公司就是個(gè)好例子，憑借“大科學(xué)”概念達(dá)到了逃逸速度,，先是成功上市,，后又被葛蘭素史克（GlaxoSmithKline）收購。這筆收購耗資7.2億美元,，不少分析人士揣度,，葛蘭素史克現(xiàn)在可能后悔了，但在當(dāng)初收購的時(shí)候，公眾反響非常熱烈,。

????2. 明明只是個(gè)項(xiàng)目,，卻偏偏要組建成大公司。許多投資者的錢就是這么浪費(fèi)的：他們?cè)噲D打造的“公司”其實(shí)只是產(chǎn)品開發(fā)平臺(tái),。先前我就寫過一篇博文探討這個(gè)問題,，投資者往往把多個(gè)項(xiàng)目捆綁在一起，同時(shí)進(jìn)行多項(xiàng)研究,，并為此組建龐大的團(tuán)隊(duì),，特別是人數(shù)眾多的行政管理人員，他們以為如此就能分散風(fēng)險(xiǎn),?？稍诙鄶?shù)時(shí)候，這樣做只不過提高了其投資對(duì)象的資本密集度,，一旦某個(gè)產(chǎn)品失敗,，整個(gè)“公司”的估值都會(huì)大幅下滑。

????大型制藥公司收購創(chuàng)業(yè)企業(yè)時(shí),，瞄準(zhǔn)的往往是單個(gè)項(xiàng)目,，因此，如果某家公司有幸擁有兩個(gè)有前途的項(xiàng)目,，比如說一個(gè)已進(jìn)入臨床實(shí)驗(yàn)二期,，另一個(gè)尚未開始臨床試驗(yàn)，那他們的價(jià)值可能遭到低估,。如果掌握了某項(xiàng)有前景的資產(chǎn),，老老實(shí)實(shí)地進(jìn)行開發(fā)就夠了，給它披上昂貴的外衣,，也就是大而無當(dāng)?shù)拇蠊就鈿?，沒有多少好處。如果可能的話,，利用臨時(shí)性的組織架構(gòu)就行,，可能連首席財(cái)務(wù)官都用不上，更不用說人事專員了,，專注于高效的產(chǎn)品研發(fā)吧,。我們的投資組合中，Stromedix和Zafgen就做得很不錯(cuò),。

????The Startup Genome project recently released a report on the DNA of internet start-ups, essentially trying to identify attributes that lead to success or failure. One of the things they found was that 74% of start-ups failed because of "premature scaling." Sounds like an unfortunate medical condition, but it's Internet companies spend too much money before they really know what they have – their product, customer, market, etc…

????While reading it, and my tech partner Fred Destin's post on it, I couldn't help but think about the issue of premature scaling in life science start-ups. Spending too much, growing too fast – not an uncommon characteristic in biotech. It almost always leads to shareholder pain and a loss of invested capital.

????Here are four types of premature scaling (or inappropriate scaling) I can think of in biotech, and we try to avoid them all:

????1. Building a Big Science story too fast. This is the "Go big or go bust" strategy with a group of Nobel laureates: Raise enormous amounts of capital to fund a novel discovery or research platform without enough evidence of target validation in a disease setting, confidence in chemical (or biological) tractability, progress on a lead program, etc. This generates big teams, big footprints, big stories – and massive burns. If the substance and, in particular, the rapid progress on product development, doesn't get in line quickly, a big gap in valuation emerges that can crush these investments.

????The right way to build a Big Science story today involves scaling consistent with a science-led, capital efficient approach: Build a sound platform with 15-20 FTEs on modest equity raises, find partners to help offset the growth and validation of that platform and then grow into the Big Science story as R&D evolves. The wrong way to build these is through rapid scaling around a hype-led fundraising machine. More often than not, investors get burnt with these.

????Synta is a good rapid-scaling example. They have raised and spent $350 million, had at one time a team of 150+ FTEs or more and built a big broad portfolio -- but their investors have suffered considerably. Story is far from over, but at the 10-year point its looking tough for the early investors.

????Sometimes this model works, at least for investors. If the company can achieve escape velocity with enough hype and buzz in the market, they can get public or acquired early. Sirtris is a good example of a high escape velocity 'big science' deal that made it pubic and was acquired; its fair to say that many spectators wonder if GSK is regretting its $720 million acquisition, but at the time the story had a ton of public relations momentum.

????2. Building a big company when it's really a project. Lots of venture money is wasted building "companies" when they are really just product development vehicles. I covered this theme under a prior blog around new liquidity theses. By stapling multiple programs together, building a big team especially on G&A and running multiple studies at once, investors often think they've diversified their risk. Most of the time they've just raised the capital intensity of their deal such that one product bump and the whole thing gets revalued enormously.

????Big Pharma buys these plays for single programs typically and so if a company is lucky enough to have two winners, say a Phase 2 and pre-clinical program, they leave real value on the table. If you've got an interesting asset, then develop it. But there's little reason to put the expensive trappings of a bigger company around it. Leverage a part-time group where possible; you probably don't need a CFO or, God forbid, an HR person. Focus on lean product development. Stromedix and Zafgen are great examples in our portfolio.