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????3. 依托合作關(guān)系快速擴(kuò)張,。生物科技公司往往被合作帶來的優(yōu)勢迷惑，因此過早進(jìn)行擴(kuò)張：他們在自己平臺上大展拳腳,，然后還拓展自己的組織和足跡,，嘗試進(jìn)行更多項目的研發(fā)——這一切都加快了燒錢的速度。簡而言之,，他們往往錯誤的把合作關(guān)系看成不需要付出代價的跑道延長線,，不幸的是，如果作為金主的合作伙伴終止這段關(guān)系,，這些生物科技公司瞬間就會失去平衡,，不得不大舉裁員。在公開市場上,，Alnylam與諾華公司（Novartis）,、Targecept與阿斯利康（AZ）之間的合作最近都已擱淺。

????尚未上市的公司資金更為緊張,，遇到這種事情就更要痛苦得多,。此種策略——大舉燒錢開發(fā)內(nèi)部項目,，而不是打造跑道——并非沒有成功可能，如果該公司足夠幸運,，能夠用合作伙伴提供的資金開發(fā)一些有趣的資產(chǎn),，那就沒問題?？墒?，這需要極佳的運氣（我想對所有生物科技公司來說運氣都不可或缺）。另一種發(fā)展策略是真正根據(jù)合作關(guān)系的需要而拓展公司,，我們投資組合中的Vitae公司這方面就管理得很不錯,。它最近一次融資還是2004年的事情，此后利用與勃林格殷格翰集團(tuán)（Boehringer Ingelheim）的合作協(xié)議延長了跑道,，同時有選擇地推進(jìn)內(nèi)部項目,。Plexxikon同樣很成功，多年來都無需籌集資金,，后來被日本第一三共制藥（Daiichi）以超過8億美元的價格收購。

????4.沒有取得重大成果就過快擴(kuò)張,。以新藥批準(zhǔn)為例,，大型制藥公司都希望，在某種很有前途的新藥獲批后的第二天,，就能拿出產(chǎn)品來,，讓銷售渠道發(fā)售。如果FDA以“完全回應(yīng)函”（CRL）拒絕批準(zhǔn),，這些公司也能承擔(dān)損失,。可對資金緊張的生物科技公司來說,，這種模式恐怕不行,，在新藥獲批之前就迅猛擴(kuò)張的小公司一敗涂地的可能性很大。幾年前的Vicuron,，還有Adolor和ARCA都是典型,，它們都在新藥獲批前就招聘了銷售人員，結(jié)果未能獲批,，不得不裁掉大量員工,。

????遭殃的不僅是銷售人員來說，這些企業(yè)（尤其是小公司）的資本集約度也會大受影響,?？裢源蟆⑦^度樂觀是這一錯誤的典型起因,，不幸的是,，董事會經(jīng)常放任這種事情發(fā)生,。Horizon Pharma（我們投資的另一家公司）最近做得就很不錯，這家公司的新藥Duexa于2011年4月份獲批,，在此之前,，它們始終將全職員工控制在20人以下。該公司現(xiàn)在已經(jīng)上市,，正在拓展銷售與市場組織,。

????過早擴(kuò)張的反面正是我們Atlas風(fēng)險投資公司創(chuàng)造的“P/B/S”概念，這指的可不是磷酸鹽緩沖鹽水（Phosphate Buffered Saline）,，而是“驗證/打造/拓展”（Prove/Build/Scale）,。也就是先小作投入，驗證某種假設(shè),，然后略微追加投資,，測試該項目，并想清楚何時該花錢締造一家公司,，等等,。我們的種子期投資多數(shù)都是為了驗證各種想法，而締造企業(yè)需要有合作伙伴（我們往往在這一階段就退出）,。擴(kuò)大規(guī)模則需要運作正常的資本市場,，在目前的市場狀況下，這一點很難實現(xiàn),。

????過早擴(kuò)張可能扼殺企業(yè)及投資,，在下次投資熱潮中，最好把這一點銘記在心,。

????本文作者布魯斯?布斯是Atlas Venture的合伙人,，他的博客地址是http://lifescivc.com/。

????譯者：小宇

????3. Building too fast on back of a partnership. Biotechs often get seduced in premature scaling by the siren song of partnering: They do a big deal on their platform, and then expand their organization and footprint, and try to work on more projects – all increasing their net burn. In short, it's often an illusion that the partnership actually brought non-dilutive runway extension to the company. Sadly, when the sugar daddy partner terminates the deal, the biotech is left way out of balance and has to RIF its staff. In the public markets, this has recently happened to Alnylam with Novartis and Targecept with AZ.

????It's much more painful for private companies with weaker cash positions. This strategy – of aggressively funding internal burn rather than buying runway – can work if the company is lucky enough to develop some interesting assets with the free cash from their partner. But there's alot of luck involved (true of all of biotech, I guess). The alternative is to truly scale your organization to the partnership. Our portfolio company Vitae has managed this reasonably well. It last raised equity in 2004, and has used its pair of deals with Boeringher to extend its runway while selectively advancing internal projects. Plexxikon was similarly successful; hadn't raised equity for years before it was bought for more than $800 million by Daiichi.

????4. Building out before a big outcome. Drug approval, for instance. In Big Pharma, having product to sell into the channel the day after approval is the goal for most blockbusters; in the event of a CRL rejection, they can eat the costs. But in cash-strapped biotech, this tends not to work. Small companies that build out aggressively before an approval more often than not get crushed. Vicuron a few years back. Adolor. ARCA. All hired sales reps prior to a pending approval, failed to get approval, and had to RIF large numbers of their employees.

????This is not only tragic for those sales folks, but it also exacts a huge tax on the capital intensity of these businesses (especially the small ones). Hubris and excessive optimism are the typical causes of this one, but sadly Boards still let this happen. Horizon Pharma (another one of ours) recently did it right – kept the company under 20 FTEs through approval of its new drug Duexa in April 2011. It's now public and working on the sales & marketing organization.

????The counterpoint to premature scaling is what we at Atlas coined P/B/S. No, not Phosphate Buffered Saline. It's "Prove/Build/Scale." Thinking through small bets to prove a hypothesis, slightly more to test the programs, when to spend to grow a company, etc. Most of our seed investing is done to prove concepts. Building requires partners (which is where we often exit). And scaling requires functioning capital markets so rarely happens today.

????Premature scaling can kill companies and investments. Worth keeping that in mind for the next budget cycle.

????Bruce Booth is a partner with Atlas Venture. He blogs at http://lifescivc.com/.